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The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic drastically 
changed our lives in multiple aspects, one of which is 
the reliance on social media during quarantine, both for 
social interaction and information-seeking purposes. 
However, the wide dissemination of misinformation on 
social media has impacted public health negatively. 
Previous studies on COVID-19 misinformation mainly 
focused on exploration of impacts and explanation of 
motivations, with few exceptions. In this study, we pro-
pose an analytical pipeline that generates corrective 
messages toward COVID-19 misinformation in a semi-
automatic fashion, and then evaluate it against a large 
amount of data. Both the automated and manual evalu-
ation results suggest the efficiency of the proposed pipe-
line, which can be used in combination with human in-
telligence by individuals and public health organiza-
tions in fighting COVID-19 misinformation. 
1. Introduction  
The ongoing pandemic drastically impacted the 
lives of millions and society at large. During this time, 
many rely on social media, not only for social interac-
tion purposes, but also as a primary information source. 
Compounding this, since no prior information regarding 
COVID-19 existed, the general population is more 
likely to regard social media as their main information 
source [1]. Although much information on social media 
may be trustworthy, the reliance of social media use in 
our daily lives has also contributed to the wide dissemi-
nation of misinformation related to COVID-19, due to 
the lack of rigorous critiques as well as ubiquitous radi-
cal ideas and misconceptions [2], which is also termed 
as information disorder in the literature [3]. Misinfor-
mation can be a matter of life and death amid a public 
health crisis like COVID-19, compared to other types of 
misinformation. A recent survey suggested that 48% of 
Americans had encountered misinformation regarding 
COVID-19 [4]. Additionally, another study by Loomba 
et al. [5] found that exposure to COVID misinformation 
lowered the number of participants who would ‘defi-
nitely’ take the vaccine by 6.2%. Consequently, re-
searchers and practitioners have studied and quantified 
the severity of COVID-19 misinformation. Singh et al. 
[6] conducted an exploratory study toward the metadata 
of COVID-19 misinformation on Twitter, including vol-
ume, location and key terms/topics from 18 million col-
lected tweets discussing COVID-19. Kouzy et al. [7] 
collected a sample of 673 tweets for an exploratory anal-
ysis on COVID-19 misinformation and metadata (e.g., 
account information, number of followers/likes/re-
tweets). Beyond meta-data analysis, researchers have 
analyzed social media content for misinformation detec-
tion and classification purposes. For instance, Hossain 
et al. [8] developed a dataset named CovidLies, which 
associates tweets to COVID-19 misconceptions, relying 
on the cosine similarity of word embeddings using the 
BERTSCORE [9] model without fine-tuning. However, 
the findings from previous studies are limited in several 
aspects. Firstly, most extant studies on COVID-19 mis-
information focus on exploration (e.g., using the 
metadata and correlation analysis [7]) or explanatory 
purposes (e.g., hypothesis testing on impacts). Sec-
ondly, few studies (e.g., [1]) focus on the detection of 
COVID-19 misinformation. However, the detection 
performances are limited due to limited-sized datasets 
used in these studies. Thirdly, other studies utilized 
topic modeling techniques, which are unsupervised and 
less capable of capturing linguistic nuances involved in 
COVID-19 misinformation. However, prior studies 
have highlighted directions for future research, which 
include: 
● Developing intelligence tools using machine learn-
ing and Natural Language Processing (NLP) for de-
tecting and intervening against COVID-19 misin-
formation [10]; 
● Collecting data from multiple sources to improve 
the generalizability of the detection models [11]; 
● Providing suggestions for combating COVID-19 
misinformation, if definition responses are not di-
rectly available [12]; 
● Leveraging prior domain knowledge, e.g., named 
entities (e.g., person, organization, location), which 








are associated with 70% of COVID-19 misinfor-
mation [11]. 
In this study, we propose a Generative Adversarial 
Network (GAN) based pipeline to enhance detection 
and facilitate intervention toward COVID-19 misinfor-
mation. GAN is a generative model consisting of a gen-
erator and a discriminator, where the former generates 
data based on the distribution of the training data, and 
the latter distinguishes generated data from the original 
data [13]. However, as the generators are typically ini-
tialized with random distributions, much of the gener-
ated data is of lower quality and is difficult to be used 
for downstream analysis. Therefore, it is beneficial to 
employ prior domain knowledge in training GANs.  
This study makes multi-fold research and technical 
contributions. Firstly, this is the first study to extend the 
analysis of COVID-19 misinformation in social media 
to the intervention level. Specifically, this study pro-
poses a semi-automatic approach to generate corrective 
messages toward COVID-19 misinformation. Secondly, 
the generated texts from the proposed Masked Language 
Model (MLM-GAN) model can be used for data aug-
mentation to further enhance the performance of detec-
tion models. Thirdly, we extend the existing GAN mod-
els by incorporating prior knowledge (e.g., Named En-
tities (NEs) and key terms), to improve the effectiveness 
and quality of the generated texts. Lastly, we include hu-
mans in the analytical loop by adding a manual review 
phase downstream from the misinformation interven-
tion module. We collect a large amount of COVID-19 
misinformation data from multiple sources to improve 
the generalizability of the proposed analytical pipeline. 
Both the automatic and manual evaluation results show 
clear evidence of the efficacy of the proposed pipeline, 
not only concerning detection but also intervention to-
wards COVID-19 misinformation. We also report sev-
eral observations, which identify future research direc-
tions regarding studies of misinformation handling. The 
analytical pipeline and the findings in this study can im-
prove the collaboration between human users in public 
health organizations and intelligent systems, in combat-
ing misinformation on social media. 
2. Prior Studies 
2.1. Misinformation in COVID-19 
Even before the COVID-19 global pandemic, social 
media had become the most popular venue for dissemi-
nating misinformation, which is partially due to the lack 
of critical thinking and the amplification of radical ideas 
in virtual communities [2]. Previous studies have also 
focused on exploring the impact and/or explaining the 
motivation of COVID-19 misinformation. For instance, 
Kouzy et al. [7] designed a correlation-based analysis on 
the metadata of COVID-19 misinformation tweets, and 
discovered that tweets from verified accounts and 
healthcare organizations had the lowest rates of misin-
formation. Additionally, Krause et al. [12] analyzed the 
multi-layered risks of COVID-19 misinformation when 
disseminated to the general public. Furthermore, Barua 
et al. [14] observed that although social media platforms 
embed fact-checking mechanisms to detect and possibly 
ban misinformation, it is still difficult to stop its spread.  
The literature has suggested that intelligent systems 
need to be developed to support public health organiza-
tions (e.g., World Health Organization) to compose cor-
rective messages in combat of COVID-19 misinfor-
mation [1], [2], [10], [11] in social media. For example, 
Tasnim et al. [10] suggested that machine learning and 
NLP tools should be leveraged for detecting and correct-
ing COVID-19 misinformation. Choudrie et al. [1] built 
a detection model on 143 labeled data points, with the 
best model in this study yielding an 86.7% accuracy. 
Another school of study focused on topic modeling con-
cerning COVID-19 misinformation. For instance, Hoss-
ain et al. [8] aligned COVID-19 related tweets with 
well-established misconceptions via a similarity-based 
method, and transformer-based models. Studies using 
similar methods can be found in [15], [16]. Despite the 
findings from these studies, they can be extended along 
following directions: 1) larger datasets can enhance the 
generalizability of the results and findings, 2) more ad-
vanced models that are capable of capturing the linguis-
tic intricacies within the misinformation, and 3) Utiliza-
tion of domain-specific knowledge for detection of 
COVID-19 misinformation.  
2.2. Transformers and Generative Models 
Transformer-based models are state-of-the-art de-
velopments in the field of NLP. Compared to traditional 
NLP methods (e.g., word2vec [17]), these models are 
more capable of capturing linguistic intricacies, since 
they are pre-trained with vast amounts of domain-inde-
pendent, general purpose textual data for pseudo classi-
fication tasks such as token classification or language 
understanding. These models include BERT (Bidirec-
tional Encoder Representations from Transformers) 
[18] and XLNet [19], which utilize the encoder compo-
nent of the multi-layered transformer-based models. In 
order to achieve superior performance on texts from a 
certain domain, these models need to be fine-tuned with 
supervised domain adaptation, which entails the “re-
training” of the models using domain-specific texts.  
On the other hand, GPT-2 [20] is a multi-layered 
transformer decoder network, which is initially pre-
trained using unlabeled data from 8 million webpages. 
Compared to transformer encoder models, which are 





models are used to generate texts for specific purposes. 
For instance, Niewinski et al. [21] proposed a generative 
enhanced model to generate malicious claims from 
online articles for adversarial attacks on fake claim clas-
sifiers. Another type of generative models are MLMs. 
Compared to the GPT-2 generative models, which gen-
erate the remainder of the sentence based on seed words, 
MLMs generate sentences by substituting masked to-
kens with the most similar tokens from the language 
space. For example, Wu et al. [22] developed a MLM 
model to transfer the sentiments within sentences. How-
ever, when solely using the GPT-2 or MLM models for 
generation purposes it is difficult to control the quality 
of the generated content. 
One of the most popular ways of addressing the 
aforementioned limitations is the GAN model [13]. 
Each GAN model consists of a generator, which cap-
tures the distribution in the data, and a discriminator, 
which estimates whether a data point is from the gener-
ator or original text. The training purpose of GANs is to 
maximize the probabilities of the discriminators to make 
mistakes, so that the generated texts from the generators 
are similar to the original training data. GANs have re-
cently been applied to textual data. For example, Zhang 
et al. [23] proposed a GAN model consisting of a Long 
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network as the generator, 
and a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) as the dis-
criminator, to generate adversarial examples to improve 
the robustness of text classifiers. One issue with this ap-
proach is that the LSTM based generators and the CNN-
based discriminations are not sufficient to capture the 
contextual information in the contexts. Thus, research-
ers have proposed using transformer-based models as 
generators/discriminators. For instance, Irissappane et 
al. [24] designed a GAN model to generate spam re-
views for augmenting their labeled training data. Utiliz-
ing transformer-based models (e.g., GPT-2) in GANs is 
a relatively new method and can be enhanced via: 1) us-
ing domain knowledge, rather than random distribution, 
to improve the efficacy; 2) fine-tuning to enhance the 
domain relatedness of the generated texts. 
3. The Analytical Pipeline 
The analytical pipeline proposed in this study, in-
cluding preprocessing, modeling and post processing 
steps,  contains several design novelties. First, We ex-
tend the literature by exploring the intervention mechan-
ics with regard to COVID-19 misinformation. In partic-
ular, the misinformation intervention module provides 
either corrective suggestions (which require further 
manual editing and filtering), responses to misinfor-
mation (which requires minimal direct human interven-
tion), or complete correction (no direct human interven-
tion needed). Second, we employ state-of-the-art trans-
former-based models, specifically BERT and GPT-2, 
for the purpose of COVID-19 misinformation detection 
and intervention. Our proposed detection method is su-
pervised, which streamlines the evaluation processes, 
and reduces the human intervention required in the eval-
uation of candidate corrective messages. Third, we de-
sign a teacher-forcing method improves the perfor-
mances of both the detection enhancement and misin-
formation intervention modules. In general, a teacher-
forcing algorithm is typically used to train recurrent 
models with input data and previous state [25]. In this 
study, we design the teacher-forcing method using prior 
human knowledge along with the training data in the 
training process of the GAN models, specifically: 
• For the detection enhancement module, the teacher-
forcing mechanism targets specific categories of 
NEs and other key terms and phrases most related 
to COVID-19. This mechanism allows for the gen-
eration of augmented training data (i.e., misinfor-
mation) to enhance the classifier for the purpose of 
detection.  
● For the misinformation intervention module, the 
same entities and key terms are extracted from true 
information and added as additional input signals. 
In this manner, the model is trained to generate less 
misinformative texts, while maintain semantic re-
latedness to the original texts. Thus, the misinfor-
mation intervention module can generate less mis-
informative substitutes that are related to the 
themes of the original texts. Additionally, we de-
sign a rating schema (see Figure 3) to evaluate how 
thoroughly the generated texts respond to the origi-
nal misinformation. The proposed schema can be 
used in other related studies to assess their impact 
in addressing COVID-19 misinformation in social 
media, or misinformation in general. 
The proposed analytical pipeline contains three 
main modules, namely misinformation detection, detec-
tion enhancement, and misinformation intervention. 
The proposed analytical pipeline is depicted in Figure 1. 
In the misinformation detection module, we design the 
misinformation Detection Model based on a fine-tuned 
BERT for sequence classification model serves as the 
initial classifier for COVID-19 misinformation detec-
tion. This model is then enhanced in downstream pro-
cesses with additional training data sourced from the 
Detection Enhancement module. The core of the detec-
tion enhancement module is a MLM-based GAN gener-
ates additional misinformative examples to enhance the 
performance of the Misinformation Detection Model. 
This serves a similar role to data augmentation tasks in 
computer vision analysis, where variations of images 
(e.g., via rotation, zooming in/out) are used as additional 





model. In the misinformation intervention module, a 
GPT2-based GAN generates whole texts in response to 
COVID-19 misinformation, bolstering human correc-
tion and validation efforts. These messages range from 
corrective suggestions (i.e., candidate messages con-
taining true information but require human validation) 
to responses (i.e., direct and fully validated counter-
points to the original text), reducing the overall time 
complexity of manually addressing misinformation per-
taining to the global pandemic. 
 
Figure 1. The Proposed Analytical Pipeline
3.1. Misinformation Detection 
For both the initial and enhanced classifiers, we 
first fine-tune a pre-trained transformer model using la-
beled COVID-19 misinformation data. The fine-tuning 
step updates all model parameters to accommodate the 
linguistic intricacies from the domain, rather than the 
generic texts used to pre-train them. Given labels 𝑦	 =
	{0,1}, where 0 indicates misinformation and 1 indicates 
true information, the objective of updating the model pa-
rameters is to minimize the loss in identifying misinfor-
mation. Let 𝑋 denote a COVID-19 related social media 
post (misinformation or true information) with 𝑚 to-
kens. Each token is then embedded by the model as a n-
dimensional vector. The transformer model embeds the 
texts through all the layers, and we then select the row 
𝑑!"#, which corresponds to the [CLS] special token 
added to the post, from the embedding matrix 𝐷 ∈
𝑅$×&, to calculate the sentence embedding 𝑠 via eq. (1), 
where 𝑊 ∈ 𝑅$×|(|and 𝑏 ∈ 𝑅|(|: 
𝑠	 = 	𝑑 ⋅ 𝑊 + 𝑏 (1) 
With the sentence embedding learned, misinfor-
mation detection is designed as the downstream task. To 
use transformer models as classifiers, we add a SoftMax 
layer as the output layer, which yields a probability dis-
tribution 𝑃(𝑦|𝑠) as the SoftMax function over 𝑠. For ex-
ample, if 𝑋 is misinformation, 𝑃(𝑦 = 0|𝑠) is calculated 
via eq. (2): 




In the output layer, we use the negative log-likeli-
hood loss as the objective function (see eq. (3)): 
𝐽(𝑋) 	= 	−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃(𝑦|𝑠))  (3) 
As mentioned previously, the purpose of the fine-
tuning process is to minimize 𝐽(𝑋). Additionally, we use 
the sentence embeddings 𝑆, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, in traditional Ma-
chine Learning classification models (e.g., eXtreme 
Gradient Boosting, Random Forest) to perform the same 
classification task. The classifier with the best classifi-
cation performance is then selected, and used to classify 
the inference data (i.e., the unlabeled data), to distin-
guish misinformation from true information. It is worth 
noting that in addition to information and misinfor-
mation, we select the data with relatively low classifica-
tion confidence from the initial classifier (i.e., classifi-
cation probabilities between 0.4 and 0.6), termed as am-
biguous data, for the purpose of evaluating whether the 
misinformation detection is enhanced using the detec-
tion enhancement module discussed in Section 3.2. Fur-
thermore, the output from the enhanced classifier is then 
used as input for the generator in the misinformation in-
tervention module. We hypothesize that after employing 
the enhanced classifier, more instances in the inference 
data are classified with higher probabilities toward true 
information and misinformation (i.e., less ambiguous), 
which is evaluated in Section 4.2. 
3.2. Detection Enhancement 
In the detection enhancement module, we design 
and implement an MLM-based GAN model. The pur-





texts that are semantically similar to the original unla-
beled texts in the inference data, so that the detection 
performance on the ambiguous data is improved in the 
downstream enhanced classifier [22]. The MLM gener-
ator is trained on a random sample of the inference data 
that are classified as misinformation by the initial clas-
sifier and combined with the sample of labeled misin-
formation of equal size. This allows the model to gener-
ate variants of misinformation from original texts. We 
target misinformation generation in this module, as the 
identification of misinformation is more vital than true 
information due to the potentially inflammatory and 
dangerous notions expressed in widespread misinfor-
mation, which can potentially threaten public health. In 
addition, rather than masking a random subset of tokens 
from each text, we mask specific types of NEs and the 
most important key terms (i.e., based on their Term Fre-
quency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF, a statis-
tical measure that evaluates how relevant a term is to a 
social media post in respective datasets, e.g., labelled 
data, inference data) values among the misinformative 
texts), which strengthens the semantic relatedness be-
tween the generated texts and the original texts. Table 1 
shows some examples of the common NEs and key 
terms from the inference data. In summary, the MLM 
generator substitutes the NEs and key terms, in addition 
to randomly masked tokens, in the original texts to gen-
erate misinformative variants. 
Table 1. Top 5 NEs and Key Terms  
Named Entities Key Terms 
Entity Frequency Term TF-IDF 
Pfizer 7,108 Vaccine 0.07 
Covid 6,021 Covid 0.03 
Biden 5,756 Pfizer 0.008 
Moderna 2,484 Government 0.008 
CDC 1,782 Johnson 0.007 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of Generated Texts from the MLM Generator 
Figure 2 presents the difference between random 
masking used in generic MLM models and the proposed 
teacher-forcing mechanism used in our pipeline. It is 
worth noting that the MLM generator generated exactly 
the same text as the original message, which demon-
strates that the generator is trained to understand the lin-
guistic patterns within the original data. We then per-
form stratified sampling on the inference data, identify-
ing those which are classified as information, misinfor-
mation, and ambiguous data. In this manner, the strati-
fied sampling prevents the downstream discriminator 
from learning solely based on textual signals relating to 
the truth behind each text of the sample. A certain num-
ber (determined heuristically) of variants are generated 
for each text in the stratified sample. To further ensure 
the generated texts are semantically similar to the origi-
nal text, we develop the discriminator to classify 
whether a text is original or generated. The discrimina-
tor is a fine-tuned BERT classifier, designed to classify 
if a piece of text is original (1) or generated (0). This 
classifier is trained with a sample of the generated texts 
as discussed above, along with an equal-sized sample of 
original texts from the inference set. It is worth noting 
that this set and the texts we select for the MLM gener-
ator are mutually exclusive. After the discriminator 
yields satisfactory classification results, we apply it on 
the generated texts from the ambiguous data determined 
by the initial classifier, then select the top-t% generated 
texts with the highest classification probabilities (t de-
termined heuristically). As discussed in the design of the 
MLM generator, these generated texts are more misin-
formative, compared to their original counterparts. 
These generated texts, termed as pseudo original misin-
formation, are then included in the training set for the 
enhanced classifier. 
3.3. Misinformation Intervention 
In the misinformation intervention module, we de-
sign and implement another GAN model with GPT-2 as 
the whole text generator and another fine-tuned BERT 
model as the whole text discriminator. For the GPT-2 
based generator, the training data includes a sample of 
the inference data, which are classified by the enhanced 
classifier as true information, as we need to maintain the 
quality of the generated texts to be less misinformative. 
To further improve the quality of the generated texts, we 
also sample a set of true information from the labeled 
data, which allows for a combination of reliable human 





the generated corrective messages. Similar to the gener-
ator in the MLM-GAN model, we select the NEs and 
key terms and append them as the prefix in each instance 
in the training set. We design this method to allow the 
generator to produce texts that are semantically related 
to the original misinformation (see Section 3.2). The 
generator is successfully trained once the generated 
texts it produces are classified as less misinformative in 
the enhanced classifier. Following this, we treat a sam-
ple of classified misinformation from the inference data 
as input data for the generator. The generator then out-
puts generated corrective messages based on this input 
data. The generated corrective messages are then classi-
fied using the enhanced classifier to ensure that they are 
less misinformative (i.e., with lower classification prob-
abilities toward the misinformation class). An example 
is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Sample Corrective Message 
Original Generated Message 
Gonna kill us all, just you 
wait and see! #depopulation 
agenda. … Research before 
we fume. “Conspiracy Theo-
rist” is looking more and 
more respectable on a CV 
nowadays, it’s the truth!🤗 
Looking forward todays 
#COVID19 press conference. 
Grateful for the endless hard 
work of public health re-
searchers and their teams at 
CDC. #StayAtHome! 
 
Similar to the discriminator in the MLM-GAN 
model, we fine-tune a BERT model to identify if the 
generated corrective message is semantically similar to 
the true information labeled by humans. We use the 
same subsample of inference data (labeled as original), 
which is also used to train the discriminator in the 
MLM-GAN, combined with a sample of the generated 
corrective messages (labeled as generated) to fine-tune 
the discriminator. After the discriminator converges at a 
satisfactory level, we apply the fine-tuned model to a re-
served set of the generated corrective messages (that are 
not used in the fine-tuning process). We then select the 
top N (determined heuristically) generated corrective 
messages based on the classification probabilities of be-
ing original, for each misinformation post generated by 
the whole text generator. These are termed as candidate 
corrective messages for downstream manual evaluation. 
Two main expected characteristics of the candidate cor-
rective messages are: i) they are less misinformative 
compared to the original misinformation counterparts, 
and ii) they are linguistically coherent. These character-
istics are evaluated manually to ensure the “human-in-
the-loop” nature of the proposed pipeline. 
4. Experiment and Results  
4.1. Experiment Data and Design 
Since COVID-19 is an ongoing event, labeled data 
regarding misinformation concerning the pandemic is 
scarce across different social media platforms. Addi-
tionally, according to a preliminary analysis of the la-
beled data, we discover that the extant labeled data are 
at various quality levels. Thus, we investigated various 
labeled datasets focusing on COVID-19 misinfor-
mation, including COVID-19 Fake News Dataset [26], 
NewsGuard Coronavirus Misinformation Tracking Da-
taset [27], COVID Fake News Dataset [28], Poynter 
CoronaVirusFacts Dataset [29], and CovidLies Dataset 
[8]. After reviewing these datasets, a sample of 13,947 
is included in this study, which contains 6,193 true in-
formation posts and 7,754 misinformation posts col-
lected from social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, 
Twitter) and news articles. Building on findings from 
prior studies, we retrieve tweets from health care organ-
izations and treat them as true information. Specifically, 
we programmatically scraped COVID-19 related data 
from i) articles on World Health Organization (WHO) 
and Center for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) 
websites (627 true information articles); ii) Tweets from 
WHO, CDC, and the director of CDC official Twitter 
accounts (5,580 true information tweets). Conversely, 
we collect public tweets containing anti-vaccine con-
tents (5,842 misinformation tweets). Each dataset is ex-
amined based on qualitative evaluations pertaining to its 
respective value for either true information or misinfor-
mation, including accuracy of statements overall, and 
accuracy at time of collection versus present day. We 
then combine all labeled data. In total, we obtain the la-
beled dataset with a size of 25,996, with 12,400 
(47.70%) true information posts and 13,596 (52.30%) 
misinformation posts. It is worth noting that we perform 
a 70%/30% split for our training and test datasets. 
In order to collect the inference data, we program-
matically retrieve Tweets discussing COVID-19, based 
on Tweet IDs reported from the CoVaxxy project [30]. 
In order to align the time period covered by the inference 
data with the labeled dataset, we retrieve the inference 
data from January 4, 2021 through April 28, 2021. We 
also perform stratified sampling on days and time of the 
day to avoid biases toward certain days/hours, produc-
ing the inference dataset consisting of 273,000 unla-
beled tweets. Within the inference data, we reserve 
1,749 (0.6%) tweets used for testing the discriminators 
in both GAN models, as discussed in Section 3. To im-
plement the design of the pipeline, we set the ratio of 
generated texts from the discriminator of the MLM-
GAN to be 10%, and the number of generated texts from 





4.2. Experiment Results 
Since the initial and the enhanced Misinformation 
Detection Model are both binary classification models, 
we select the weighted average precision, recall, f1 
score and Area Under the Receiver Operator Character-
istic Curve (ROC) as the evaluation metrics. The initial 
model yields high performance, attaining an F1 score of 
0.97, and an AUC score of 0.99 against the test set, 
which outperforms all other classifiers in our experi-
ment. These results are superior compared to the extant 
detection models toward COVID-19 misinformation 
(e.g., [1]). However, despite the high level of perfor-
mance, the initial Misinformation Detection Model 
shows inadequate performance on the ambiguous data, 
which are classified incorrectly more often than not, 
yielding a precision of .97, a recall of .53, an F1 of .68, 
and AUC score of 0.34, indicating that the initial model 
correctly classified most of the ambiguous data to be 
true information (which they actually are), it is less ca-
pable of identifying the misinformative posts in them. 
With the generated examples from the MLM-GAN in-
corporated into the training of the enhanced Misinfor-
mation Detection Model, the AUC score on the ambig-
uous data improves to 0.86, with the precision, recall, 
and F1 improved 0.02 – 0.08, respectively (see Table 3). 
Such improvements suggest that with the more misin-
formative examples generated by the MLM-GAN, our 
misinformation detection model is more capable of de-
tecting the borderline misinformation posts. 
Table 3. Performances on Ambiguous Data 
Model Precision Recall F1 AUC 
Initial .97 .53 .68 .34 
Enhanced .99  .61 .75 .86 
The results demonstrate that the detection enhance-
ment in the proposed pipeline significantly improves the 
robustness of the detection model, with the help of more 
variance in the training data. Additionally, we quantita-
tively evaluate the candidate corrective messages 
against their respective original counterparts, to deter-
mine if the candidate corrective messages from the mis-
information intervention module are corrective in na-
ture. Since the enhanced Misinformation Detection 
Model yields reliable results, we leverage it to measure 
improvement by comparing the classification probabili-
ties of being true information. We randomly sample 317 
candidate corrective messages, and the maximum in-
crease in the classification probabilities is 0.995, with an 
overall average percentage growth of 5,432%. An inde-
pendent t-test shows that the classification probabilities 
of the candidate corrective messages and their respec-
tive original counterparts are significantly different (p < 
0.05). 
4.3. Manual Evaluation 
In order to manually evaluate the efficacy of the 
candidate corrective messages, we design an evaluation 
scale (see Figure 4), which measures different levels of 
required manual intervention toward COVID-19 misin-
formation. Additionally, this scale provides benchmark-
ing of the misinformation intervention module in meas-
uring how much manual intervention remains toward 
the candidate corrective messages. Specifically, we de-
sign the scale levels as follows. Level (i), Explora-
tion/Explanation refers to basic investigations which 
identifies that misinformation exists in a specific do-
main and quantitatively analyzes the impact of the dis-
semination of this false information. The natural pro-
gression from this point is Level (ii), Detection, refer-
ring to the ability to identify texts as either true infor-
mation or misinformation in a specific domain. Despite 
identifying the misinformation, humans must craft re-
sponses and/or corrections in a fully manual manner. 
 
Figure 4. Scale of Required Manual Intervention
Level (iii), Corrective Suggestions, builds on iden-
tification of misinformation by providing automatic 
generation of texts which contain truthful elements per-
taining to the misinformative texts. Rather than requir-
ing a fully manual effort to create new responses, human 
experts can manually modify the generated text to pro-
vide the most relevant true information. This step con-
stitutes the first instance of machine-generated texts be-
ginning to lessen the amount of effort required by hu-
mans in the effort to combat misinformation. This is 
progressed as generated texts become Responses to Mis-
information (iv). At this level, automatic generation of 
texts require minimal human intervention to be consid-
ered truthful and informative with regards to the initial 
misinformation. Instances which surpass this require no 
human intervention and are referred to as Complete Cor-
rections (v). Specifically, generated texts completely 
correct the initial misinformation and provide the true 
counterpart information in a fully automated fashion. 
Most of the extant studies are at the first (exploration/ex-





provide interventions to combat COVID-19 misinfor-
mation, the generated corrective messages need to be at 
least at the corrective suggestions level. We evaluated 
the candidate corrective messages using the aforemen-
tioned scale. Due to time constraints, we randomly sam-
ple the top 0.5% (500 data points) from the inference 
data, by their classification probabilities from the en-
hanced classifier. We also manually review this sample 
to ensure they are indeed COVID-19 misinformation 
contents in order to evaluate the intervention module in 
isolation. We then leverage the proposed misinfor-
mation intervention module (see Section 3.3) to gener-
ate a maximum of 15 candidate corrective messages for 
each misinformation post in the evaluation sample. 
Three raters from different backgrounds independently 
evaluate each text, against the levels in the proposed 
scale (see Figure 4).
. Table 4. Example of Candidate Corrective Messages in Different Categories 
Original Misinformation Text Generated Corrective Messages 
Example of Complete Correction 
Finally people are waking up from this slavery!!! People are 
a lot more powerful then these global fascists and their 
plandemic!! #stopmasks #DemocratsAreDestroyingAmerica 
#FightDictators #NOVaccinePassports #NoVaccine 
#WearAMask over your nose and mouth to stop the spread of 
this virus. #CovidVaccine #WearAMask 
Example of Response to Misinformation 
Ooops! He let it slip 🙈 New Variants Being “DEVEL-
OPED” 
Plandemic/Scamdemic at it’s best. 
Here are 5 tips that help you stay safe to protect yourself and 
others from #COVID19: 
clean hands 
wear a face mask 
stay distant 
cough, sneeze safely 
Example of Corrective Messages 
Valid Claims Natural Remedies Prevent, Treat or Cure 
Covid-19 Are Now Being Censored by the FDA  
As folks realize that COVID is a #Plandemic that is being 
used to terrorize us into slavery, the elites and social media 
oligarchs are in an absolute panic.  
The U.S. is using simulation exercises to prepare for and pre-
vent real-world #COVID19. 
 
The raters conducted a training and discussion 
phase on 50 randomly sampled candidate corrective 
messages to ensure a consensus of the scale levels. The 
sampled evaluation data are rated as either: corrective 
suggestion, responses to misinformation, or complete 
correction, as described above. All posts that cannot 
be classified as any of the above three levels are cate-
gorized as detection, according to the reliable perfor-
mance of the enhanced Misinformation Detection 
Model. Our initial results show that approximately 
75% of cases had at least one rater believing the can-
didate corrective messages were at least Corrective 
Suggestions, and our raters were in complete agree-
ment in approximately 18% of the cases that the can-
didate corrective messages from the evaluation data 
were Corrective Suggestions or higher. The overall 
agreement among all raters is 43%. We discuss the 
possible reasons for the moderate agreement level in 
Section 5. On average our raters view approximately 
52% of the candidate corrective messages as being at 
least corrective suggestions, which indicates that more 
than half of the candidate corrective messages are of 
a corrective nature. Additionally, we calculate intra-
rater reliability in a pairwise manner between each 
rater using Cohen’s Kappa statistic, which ranges from 
0, signaling rating agreement as purely random, to 1 
which implies perfect agreement. Our Fleiss Kappa 
statistic is 0.45, which signifies moderate agreement 
among raters (0.41 – 0.80). Combined with the statis-
tics reported above, this value suggests that the pro-
posed analytical pipeline incorporates both human and 
machine intelligence in the intervention loop. Also, the 
low quality of the extant labeled data on COVID-19 
misinformation suggests that labeling/rating is a diffi-
cult task, thus we believe the results from this study 
are of sufficient reliability. Table 4 presents examples 
of the corrective messages passed the human ratings, 
and the respective original counterparts. 
5. Lessons Learned  
Both the automated and manual evaluation results 
provide clear evidence that the proposed analytical 
pipeline is capable of generating corrective messages, 
which not only exhibits superior detection effective-
ness, but also extends current studies concerning mis-
information on social media to a new level. In addi-
tion, we learned several lessons from the experiment 
and its results reported in Section 4. 
The manual evaluation results are conclusive in 
displaying state-of-the-art advancements of human-in-





moderate intra-rater agreement. The reasoning behind 
this phenomenon is three-fold. First, the COVID-19 
pandemic is ongoing and changing rapidly. Therefore, 
prior and stable information, which is required in a 
qualitative review, is nearly non-existent [1]. Second, 
the expertise of human raters are disjointed, consisting 
of data science, data engineering, and the medical pro-
fession respectively. Levels of disagreement among 
raters evaluating the corrective suggestions stem from 
the differing subject matter perspectives among raters. 
Third, prior studies (e.g., [1], [11]) have suggested that 
human knowledge is insufficient in detecting COVID-
19 misinformation, which calls for (semi-)automatic 
decision tools. It is also highlighted in previous studies 
that during an ongoing public health event (e.g., 
COVID-19), it is difficult to identify the experts and 
to seek expert opinions [3]. We believe that moderate 
agreement despite these differences in backgrounds 
serves as an unambiguous sign of success with our 
process. Furthermore, the proposed analytical pipeline 
enables more timely responses to misinformation 
compared to manual responses, which can reduce the 
effect of misinformation despite the coherence level of 
the corrective messages [31]. 
Our proposed analytical pipeline was initially the-
orized as a means to aid human-in-the-loop efforts to 
intervene against COVID-19 misinformation on social 
media. However, after reviewing the manual evalua-
tion results, we discovered that the proposed pipeline 
can be used as a training tool for the individuals and 
related organizations who combat COVID-19 misin-
formation. Our pipeline is capable of collecting large 
quantities of both misinformative and informative 
texts to help human users understand the differences 
between the two. Additionally, the misinformation in-
tervention module provides examples of how to alter 
or update misinformation in order to correct these 
texts, which largely improves the performance of non-
domain experts. By developing an intelligent system 
that serves as a model for their imminent responsibili-
ties, we can help to fully train the workforce to combat 
misinformation, which is not limited to the context of 
COVID-19, without requiring as much domain 
knowledge. 
6. Conclusion  
COVID-19 misinformation on social media has 
become a severe issue in the ongoing global pandemic, 
jeopardizing public health by hindering social media 
users from perceiving valuable information regarding 
treatments and best practices. Extant studies have fo-
cused on the impact and motivation of COVID-19 
misinformation, and largely ignored intervening 
against them. In this study, we propose an analytical 
pipeline, which not only yields superior misinfor-
mation detection results via advanced detection mod-
els and GAN based data augmentation tools, but also 
provides corrective suggestions to assist human users 
in combating COVID-19 misinformation. The inten-
sive automatic and manual evaluation results showed 
superior efficacy of the proposed pipeline toward 
COVID-19 misinformation detection and interven-
tion. Additionally, this pipeline is generalizable to 
misinformation in other contexts if the models are 
fine-tuned with relevant texts. Moreover, the proposed 
pipeline can be used to bridge the gap in the disjoint 
expertise in human analysts, and to train non-domain 
experts concerning misinformation intervention. 
We acknowledge that this study comes with sev-
eral limitations, which may point to possible directions 
for future research. Firstly, the proposed pipeline is a 
decision support system, which is not able to generate 
complete corrective information to combat COVID-19 
misinformation. Even with the help of the latest devel-
opments in transformer-based models, such as GPT-3, 
we still believe that the pipeline is most suitable as an 
intelligent assistant/educational tool. Secondly, alt-
hough the transformer-based models (e.g., BERT, 
GPT-2) are capable of capturing the linguistic nuances 
in social media texts, we believe additional measures, 
such as semantic similarity between the generated 
texts and their original counterparts should be consid-
ered, in order to improve the relatedness between 
them. Thirdly, we believe that improved quality of the 
labeled training data can lead to improved semantic 
correctness and scientific precision of the generated 
corrective messages. Thus, we plan to conduct inten-
sive manual labeling improve the label accuracy. 
Fourthly, we believe that the performance gap be-
tween the initial and enhanced detection models can 
be partially attributed to the writing style differences 
between true and false information. More data at vari-
ous coherence levels can help with the generalizability 
of the proposed pipeline. Lastly, the misinformation 
can be further categorized according to different topics 
(e.g., vaccine, masks), and different pipelines can be 
developed to fight misinformation under each topic. 
Another way to address this limitation is possibly in-
corporate the reinforcement learning mechanism in the 
design of the proposed analytical pipeline [32]. 
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